Self-preferences oftentimes overly inform how people make inferences about others in a process called anchoring. One intriguing possibility is that self-anchor biases and different mnemonic precision for individuals versus groups distort the comparison of individuals' social preferences to the 'allocentric' larger world. Before and after a social comparison task, participants gave social preference ratings for themselves, along with several different individuals and groups. In a social comparison task, participants then inferred a stranger's preferences learned relative to one of the two previously rated individuals, and decided how the stranger's preferences related to the different groups. Replicating previous work, participants exhibited self-anchoring when rating entities. Using a signal detection model, we observed that accuracy on the social comparison task correlated with the absolute distance between the stranger and choice options, which was modulated by participants' memory for a given rating. Examining the influence of egocentric anchoring on the social comparison of other individuals, we observed that high egocentric anchoring to groups diminished accuracy on the most difficult social comparison trials. These preliminary results implicate social anchor biases in causing 'self-interference' when trying to disambiguate the similar preferences of others during social decision-making.